The Atlas- Centaur Story—Jack Fisher . Their developments proceeded in parallel and they both had their share of difficulties. Five of the first seven Centaur test flights failed and some quarters related this to delays in the Surveyor program. Fortunately operational capability was achieved at nearly the same point for both Centaur and Surveyor in early 1. Surveyor launch on May 3. This shortly became a joint ARPA and Air Force program.
After the formation of NASA in 1. NASA. At this time plans called for the use of Centaur to launch the Mariner missions to Venus and Mars, the Surveyor lunar mission, and the Do. D. The Advent mission placed a requirement for several Centaur engine restarts as a parking orbit was required to position the satellite for injection into a transfer orbit following a 5- hour coast prior to injection into a geosynchronous orbit. In the spring of 1. Marshall informed JPL that Centaur could not inject the required 2.
This change required that the Surveyor be redesigned to accommodate the lesser payload. During 1. 96. 2 there was Congressional pressure to cancel both the Centaur and Surveyor programs. The Centaur development was in trouble quickly with several engine explosions on test stands at P& W.
On May 8, 1. 96. 2 the first flight was lost when an insulation shield failed and the vehicle exploded 5. Further problems arose due to managerial neglect at MSFC with their focus on development of the Saturn launch vehicle. In August 1. 96. 2 Werner von Braun recommended cancellation of the Centaur program and use of the Saturn C- 1 with an Agena third stage for the Mariner and Surveyor missions. NASA headquarters vetoed this proposal and in September transferred the Centaur program to the Lewis Research Center in Cleveland. Lewis had considerable previous experience in the handling of cryogenic propellants and therefore was deemed to be capable of managing the Centaur project for NASA. Abe Silverstein, the newly named director of LRC, took over personal management of the Centaur program. The contract with GD was renegotiated at $3.
The Centaur Program was originally managed by Werner von Braun at the Army Ballistic Missile. Following congressional hearings and internal NASA deliberations, the Centaur Program was transferred.
M for 1. 4 flight vehicles plus a number of test articles with a fixed fee of $3. M. NASA insisted upon a number of changes at GD including adoption of PERT and a move from matrix to project management as well as a strengthening of systems engineering. Silverstein also decided that the requirement for a two- burn Surveyor mission be abandoned until the single- burn or direct ascent mission had been successfully achieved.
Find great deals on eBay for atlas centaur general dynamics. Shop with confidence. The Centaur Upper Stage Vehicle. Centaur was flown on Atlas for NASA in the 1960’s. Centaur History The Centaur program began in 1958 with its first. ATLAS CENTAUR LV-3C DEVELOPMENT HISTORY. NASA transferred the Centaur program from MSFC to Lewis Center in Cleveland. 50 Years Ago Today: The Launch of Atlas-Centaur 5.
This placed additional constraints on the Surveyor mission, but fortunately the mission was still possible in the mid- 1. My personal knowledge of Centaur expanded greatly at this time. In May 1. 96. 3 I attended a Centaur familiarization course held at GD in San Diego. I was also the Hughes representative to the Centaur coordination meetings that began when LRC took over the project. These meetings were held at JPL, GD in San Diego, and LRC in Cleveland with representatives from GD, NASA Lewis, JPL and Hughes. Some of the issues I remember were the Centaur payload capability estimates that concerned us all.
LRC introduced the idea of a 3- sigma propellant reserve that disturbed JPL and Hughes as the Surveyor weight was uncertain at this time and every bit of performance was crucial. As I recall the propellant reserve amounted to about 1. Since this propellant reserve had to be carried to injection into the translunar trajectory it was equivalent to payload weight. In retrospect, it just seems like good engineering practice to have this kind of reserve. Another issue that concerned this group was the possibility of the Surveyor Canopus sensor detecting the spent Centaur while trying to lock on the star. This possibility was avoided by a retrothrust maneuver following an attitude change that also prevented the Centaur from impacting the moon.
No payload was carried. June 3. 0, 1. 96. AC- 3, Centaur engines shut down prematurely after a hydraulic pump failure. December 1. 1, 1.
AC- 4, attempted to demonstrate RL- 1. Carried a 2. 10. 0- pound Surveyor mass model. March 3, 1. 96. 5 AC- 5 carried a Surveyor SD- 1 dynamic mass model. Atlas exploded on Launch Complex 3. A severely damaging the complex. NASA had mothballed LC3. B at 9. 0% completion to save money so it had to be completed and LC3.
A had to be repaired. August 1. 1, 1. 96. AC- 6 flawless single burn mission of 4. Surveyor SD- 2 dynamic model. April 7, 1. 96. 6 AC- 8, from LC3. B failed to restart for second burn after 2. Surveyor dynamic model SD- 3.
October 2. 6, 1. 96. AC- 9, successful Centaur restart after a 2. Surveyor dynamic model SD- 4. All seven Surveyor missions were successfully launched by the Atlas Centaur: Surveyors I, 2 and 4 using the direct ascent mode and Surveyors III, V, VI and VIII using the parking orbit mode. We had just won the Navy UHF competition to deliver ten satellites in orbit, giving us the responsibility for buying the Launch Services. We won the contract assuming a very good prices for launching without having final firm bids from LM and General Dynamics. A very intense competition between those two followed with both companies seeing this as a possibility to jump start their commercial launch business and Hughes looking for an agressive price to fit our own aggresive bid for the first large order for the HS 6.
Al Lovelace the ex NASA administrator and GD lead for commercial Atlas flew into LA on the company jet and he and I met at the private jet facilities to hammer out a deal which came close to what we needed and was very aggresive on their part. This started GD and Atlas into the commercial lunch business and they wound up successfully launching 1. UHF HS6. 01s which was a successful and profitable contract for Hughes. The Atlas Centaur remains the leading commercial launch vehicle today. It was win- win for both companies.